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The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, coupled with advances in 
communication technology, have brought the general public into the decision-making 
process for environmental reviews required to make federally funded infrastructure 
project decisions. This public participation is well pronounced in the state of Hawaii with 
its strong environmental, historical, and cultural ties. This public involvement, along with 
the often variable analysis and communication requirements, has the potential to add 
significant cost and schedule risk to ongoing and future infrastructure development 
projects. This thesis evaluates past project challenges and provides common themes and 
lessons learned to reduce the likelihood of repeating past mistakes. It is envisioned that 
the Department of Defense will be able to use this information to reduce cost and 
schedule risk for future infrastructure projects in the state of Hawaii. 
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Over the past 50 years, we, as a nation, have become significantly more aware of the 
need to protect our natural environment and the potential for significant negative 
environmental impacts when progress goes unchecked. The National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 established a federally mandated process that provided the 
means for the general public to be a crucial check that weighs the benefits of 
advancement against the costs to the environment. Since the inception of the NEPA, the 
courts have had a significant influence in the determination of appropriate compliance 
with the act and this has added, and will continue to add, significant cost and schedule 
risk to affected projects. 
Nowhere is this cost and schedule risk more prevalent than in the state of Hawaii, 
where the citizens have a strong relationship with the natural environment, island culture, 
and island history. With a relatively small land mass and abundance of unique 
environmental and archeological artifacts, development permitting on the islands of 
Hawaii is often a lengthy and emotional process.  
With the United States in the midst of its strategic pivot toward Asia, the Pacific, 
and the Indian Ocean, and with the Islands of Hawaii providing the United States’ 
“gateway to Asia,” there is certain to be an upswing in defense infrastructure 
development on the islands. 
After review of three recent major infrastructure projects, two that failed and one 
still in progress, it is clear that to be successful the federal government, in particular the 
departments of Defense and Homeland Security, will need to develop a strategy to 
address both real and perceived environmental impacts well before project plans are 
approved.  
With changing legal interpretation of the NEPA and the Hawaii Environmental 
Policy Act (HEPA), it is difficult to predict what the future will bring in the way of 
requirements. The review of these three infrastructure projects shows that there are 
common themes that contribute to cost increases and schedule delays, and that project 
 xvi 
managers can take specific actions to reduce the cost and schedule risks associated with 
complying with the requirements of the NEPA and HEPA.  
The research showed that the principal challenges were insufficient early public 
communication on key environmental concerns and a lack of effective public perception 
management. In all three of the case studies, these two issues alone caused significant 
project delays and cost increases. The research also showed that had these issues been 
addressed early, construction may have been delayed; however, the cost of delays would 
have been lower than they were post-contract award. In addition, it is likely that public 
trust would have been increased, reducing the amount of cost and schedule risk the 
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The United States Department of Defense (DoD) has had a strong military 
presence in the state of Hawaii that dates before the infamous attack on Pearl Harbor in 
1941. According to Hawaii’s Department of Business, Economic Development and 
Tourism, in 2009, there were more than 60,000 people employed by the military in 
Hawaii (Department of Business, Economic Development and Tourism, 2010). In 
addition there were roughly 60,000 military dependents residing in the state. With a state 
population of just under 1.4 million, this accounts for nearly 10% of the population. It is 
no wonder that the United States DoD is the second major source of revenue to the state 
of Hawaii, falling second only to tourism. 
Despite the military’s long history and significant contribution to the local 
economy, there is continued friction between the local communities and the military. This 
friction can be traced as far back as 1893 when U.S. Naval forces assisted the Committee 
of Safety, which was comprised of mainly American and European residents, with 
overthrowing the Hawaiian monarchy. Today, locals are becoming increasingly 
concerned about the negative effects of military operations on the environment. In 
addition to the recent increase in tension, Hawaiians have a long history of opposition to 
industrial development, especially in the rural areas and on the lesser populated islands. 
Today, we see the wars in the Middle East winding down, and the United States 
resuming its strategic shift in focus to Asia, the Pacific, and the Indian Ocean (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2012) during what has been coined as America’s “Pacific 
Century” (Clinton, 2011). Because of this shift, Hawaii, otherwise known as America’s 
gateway to the Pacific, is poised to see an increase in defense activity both in operations 
and in infrastructure development. This increase in activity will result in economic 





One of the principal stumbling blocks for infrastructure projects on the Hawaiian 
Islands is the development of the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and the 
Environmental Assessment (EA). It is not uncommon for the approval and litigation 
associated with these documents to add tens of millions of dollars and months or years of 
delays to major projects. Unlike most other environmental legislation, the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and the Hawaii Environmental Policy Act of 1974 do 
not prohibit federal projects from harming the environment; rather, these acts were 
created to inform stakeholders, to include the public, of the environmental impact, 
mitigation measures, and alternatives to the proposed projects. Complications arise due to 
various interpretations of how well stakeholders need to be informed; what alternatives 
need to be evaluated and to what level of detail; and what mitigation measures are 
feasible given cost and schedule constraints. These various interpretations generally lead 
to a significant amount of litigation, legal cost, project delays, and project cost overruns.  
As we enter what appears to be a fiscally constrained time when it comes to 
defense spending, to make best use of scarce dollars it is important that the DoD have a 
comprehensive strategy to meet the increasing demands for environmental impact review 
prior to the execution of infrastructure development projects. Without an effective 
strategy, it will be difficult for the DoD to develop needed infrastructure within a 
reasonable financial and time budget.  
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study is to assist the DoD with reducing infrastructure cost 
and schedule risk through a greater understanding of the EIS and EA process. Given the 
complexity and required investment for developing these documents it is important that 
project managers understand where and why past projects have stumbled and what steps 
could have been taken to mitigate the impact of those missteps. The development of these 
documents is technically and socially complex, with simple oversights turning into major 
cost and schedule drivers. Project managers need to actively manage the EIS and EA 





courts to decide the required depth of environmental and alternative analysis.  By looking 
at both the technical and social complexities this study will assist the project manager 
with avoiding common mistakes, while providing insight into the mechanics of public 
trust.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
As we become more aware of the delicate nature of our natural environment and 
take steps to protect it against negative impacts, we should be mindful of the need to 
balance progress with environmental protection. The easiest way to protect the 
environment is to do nothing at all, stop infrastructure development and stop technology 
advancement. This, however, is not practical, and one needs to accept that as we 
progress, there will be some level of negative environmental impact. NEPA and HEPA 
regulations have set the stage for the owners of this environment, the public, to have a 
voice in the determination of the appropriate balance. Unfortunately, if the EIS and EA 
development process is not executed effectively, it becomes more about politics, 
litigation, and monetary influence, and less about finding balance and mitigating 
environmental impacts. Once a project goes down this path, precious resources will be 
funneled away from technological progress and environmental protection measures and 
into the courts. For the reduction of project cost and schedule risk, and the protection of 
our natural environment, this process needs to be executed effectively. These 
requirements lead to the research questions: 
1. Can the DoD reduce risk to major infrastructure development projects on the 
Hawaii Islands through a greater understanding of the EIS and EA 
development and communication process? 
2. How important is public perception to the success of major infrastructure 





D. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
As we become more aware of how human actions impact the natural environment, 
we become increasingly concerned with the impacts of infrastructure, both in 
construction and utilization. For the DoD to successfully accomplish its mission of 
providing the military forces needed to deter war and to protect the security of the 
country, it must invest in significant infrastructure. When it comes to managing 
environmental impacts, we hold our federal government to the highest standard. This 
research is intended to provide baseline knowledge that will assist the U.S. Navy in 
effectively meeting the environmental impact communication requirements while 
reducing federally funded infrastructure project cost and schedule risk. 
E. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis focuses on project cost and schedule impacts as a result of compliance 
with the NEPA and HEPA regulations. This thesis further focuses the research on 
impacts to major infrastructure projects undertaken in the State of Hawaii. It is important 
to note that NEPA and HEPA regulations are not the only federal and state environmental 
and land use regulations that need to be considered prior to execution of an infrastructure 
project. These additional requirements are touched on in the development of the case 
studies but because they are separate and distinct from those statutes arising as a result of 
the NEPA and HEPA they are not addressed in the lessons learned. 
This research identified the contributing factors that led to project failure or cost 
growth. These factors were then grouped into themes to understand commonality across 
projects, understand general failure mechanics, and to determine what, if anything, the 
project personnel could have done to mitigate the impacts. Common themes and risk 
mitigation steps were then combined to develop risk mitigation strategies which could be 
applied across a wider variety of infrastructure projects.   
The three projects used for case studies were chosen due to their differing scopes, 





over five billion dollars. Executing activities included a private firm, the state of Hawaii, 
and the federal government. Intended purposes included scientific discovery, land based 
transportation, and ocean based transportation.   
Multiple sources of information were used in the development of this thesis to 
include: project plans, court proceedings, project funded environmental impact 
documentation, and newspaper and journal articles. Project plans were evaluated to 
determine the planned scope of the environmental analysis and public outreach. Court 
proceedings were used to develop an understanding of the primary environmental and 
procedural concerns, the project’s rebuttals, and the court’s interpretation of the required 
extent of environmental analysis and communication. Court proceedings were also used 
to develop an understanding of the affiliations of those bringing suit against the projects 
and the strategies they employed in the event that a court found in favor of the project. 
Project funded environmental analysis was reviewed to understand the project’s 
documented environmental impact and newspaper and journal articles were reviewed to 






















II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. NEPA DESK GUIDE 
In 1999, the General Service Administration (GSA) published the NEPA Desk 
Guide. The purpose of the guide was to assist GSA staff and contractors with meeting the 
requirements of the NEPA in accordance with the Council on Environmental Quality 
(CEQ) regulations (40 CFR 1500-1508) and GSA OrderADM1095.1F (Environmental 
considerations in Decision making) (U.S. General Services Administration, 1999). 
Although the guide was written for the GSA, because the implementing regulations are 
the same as for the DoD, the guide can be used as a reference for DoD project managers. 
The guide contains the NEPA background, requirements, and policies. The guide also 
provides easy-to-follow summary guidance, checklists and references, an example of 
which is shown in Figure 1. It is a valuable resource for a project or program manager to 
get a general understanding of the NEPA requirements. The guide is purely policy, items 
such as lessons learned, best practices, and risk mitigation techniques are not within the 






Figure 1.  NEPA in a Nutshell (From U.S. General Services Administration, 1999) 
B. NEPA ANALYSIS GUIDANCE MANUAL 
In 2007, the U.S. Army released the NEPA Analysis Guidance Manual (Canter, 





and issues are a major contributor to NEPA litigation, and developed the guide based 
upon Cumulative Effects Analysis (CEA) and the Council on Environmental Quality’s 
CEA guidelines. The guide goes well beyond the GSA guide, not just in the area of 
cumulative effect, but in the breakout of specific Valued Environmental Components. 
The guide identifies 14 Valued Environmental Components and for each one provides 
background information, “quick look” questions, and step-by-step guidance for the 
impact analysis. The “quick look” questions are an essential part of the guide as they 
allow the project manager to evaluate the need to address a particular environmental 
component, based on objective questions. 
 Valued Environmental Components (After Canter, Chawla, & Webster, 2007) Table 1.  






Threatened and Endangered Species 
Wetlands Resources 





Hazardous Materials/Hazardous Wastes 
Traffic and Transportation Systems 
 
This guide provides a useful framework for addressing overall impacts in the 
areas covered by the Valued Environmental Components, and the “quick look” questions 
make it easy to determine the necessary level of analysis for each of the components. 
Because the guide focuses on the impact analysis, it does not provide sufficient detail on 





For this, a project manager will have to turn to one of the many available procedural 
guides, such as the GSA’s NEPA Desk Guide.    
C. BEST PRACTICES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 
MANAGEMENT 
In 2002 the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) updated their best practices 
guide (Federal Aviation Administration, 2013). The guide is available on their website 
and outlines best practices in the areas of management techniques, approaches, and 
actions that can make the environmental process more streamlined and efficient. The 
FAA guide focuses the best practices into the areas shown in Table 2.   
 FAA Best Practice Focus Areas (After Federal Aviation Administration, 2013) Table 2.  
Best Practice Focus Areas 
EIS Project Management 
Early Project Planning 
Community Consultation 
Consultant Selection & Skills 
EIS Teams & Teamwork 
Scoping an EIS 
Interagency & Intra-Agency Coordination 
Environmental Processes 
Managing EIS Technical Analyses 
Use of Technology 
Managing Environmental Documents 
 
One of the more informational sections of the FAA guide is the Community 
Consultation section. Within this section the guide identifies some relatively inexpensive 
techniques to reduce project cost and schedule risk. These techniques include: 
• Establishment of long-term cooperative consultation between the project 
and the community representatives 
• Establishment of a citizens advisory community 





• An effective forum for constructive exchanges on the expected benefits, 
impacts, alternatives, and mitigation prospects 
• Serious consideration of community concerns and views, including project 
adjustments that have merit and are possible, as well as responses to major 
community proposals that cannot be accommodated and the reasons why 
• Reasonable accessibility to the project manager for responses to 
community questions and clarification of information. 
• A public outreach program 
• Informal workshops at periodic points during the planning process 
The guide does not provide NEPA regulation implementation guidance, but the lessons 
learned and risk mitigation statements are useful for the development of the project plan.  
D. NEPA AND ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING: TOOLS, TECHNIQUES, 
AND APPROACHES FOR PRACTITIONERS 
Charles H. Eccleston has written numerous books on environmental planning and 
NEPA requirements. His book, NEPA and Environmental Planning: Tools, Techniques, 
and Approaches for Practitioners released in 2008 (Eccleston, 2008) is a comprehensive 
guide to the environmental analysis process. The book covers NEPA and other 
environmental management requirements, environmental litigation and judicial review, 
approaches for streamlining the NEPA process, statistics for cost and schedule associated 
with the NEPA process, risk analysis techniques, and project lessons learned. In his book 
Eccleston identified that “All too frequently, NEPA is implemented more as a permitting 
requirement for documenting decisions already made than as a true decision making 
process.” Eccleston also states that “many planning failures can frequently be traced 
directly to the fact that NEPA has either not been properly integrated with other federal 
planning processes or not pursued during the early planning phase as required by NEPA 
regulations.” This book is an essential resource for project managers looking for ways to 





E. EXPLORING NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT PROCESS 
ACROSS FEDERAL LAND MANAGEMENT AGENCIES 
Marc Stern and Michael Mortimer published the paper titled Exploring National 
Environmental Policy Act Process across Federal Land Management Agencies 
(Mortimer, 2009) with the intent of answering three basic questions regarding federal 
agency actions when executing their NEPA processes. The three questions were: 
• How do different land management agencies define success of their NEPA 
processes? 
• What lessons for enhancing agency performance in NEPA processes 
might be applicable between and across these agencies? 
• What do agency personnel consider to be the primary strengths and 
weaknesses of their processes? 
In answering these questions through a series of interviews, the authors uncovered 
a number of inefficiencies in the NEPA processes arising for a lack of agency 
understanding of the goals of the NEPA legislation and individual perceptions regarding 
the utility of the process itself.  
The authors found that EIS authors did not have a clear picture of the intended 
audience and for those that understood the public was the intended audience, they did not 
believe that the NEPA documents were an “effective communication tool” for the public. 
They also found that both real and the threat of litigation “permeates all aspects of NEPA 
implementation.” They found that litigation had a direct impact on the document’s length 
and inclusion of analysis not directly related to the scope of the project. The authors also 
found that those charged with developing the NEPA documents treated them primarily as 
a “hoop to jump through.” As Eccleston (Eccleston, 2008) did, the authors determined 
that the NEPA process was not necessarily connected to the project’s decision making 
process and decisions were made long before the completion of the NEPA process.  
The authors question the linkage between NEPA and adaptive management, given 
that the current interpretation of NEPA requirements push projects to “make predictions 
with some reasonable degree of certainty, even when adequate information is not 





implementation as necessary to achieve a project’s purpose and need.” With regard to 
public outreach, the authors concluded that “even the best public outreach can be foiled 
by any one entity that wishes to remain outside the process or is determined to sue 
regardless of agency efforts.” While at the same time “enhancing the general publics’ 
perceptions of federal agencies can have many more benefits than merely avoiding 
litigation.” 
By using case study and direct interview of past project coordinators, the authors 
have developed a valuable resource for project managers faced with the task of 
developing NEPA documentation.  
F. LITERATURE REVIEW SUMMARY 
The literature review identified several sources of information that are essential 
references for project cost and schedule risk reduction. Unfortunately, government 
project managers, by training and habit, typically look only to agency governing 
documentation for this information. Although the literature review did uncover agency 
governing documents that adequately covered how to meet the NEPA requirements, little 
agency data was uncovered that would assist the project manager with the development 
of a balanced risk approach to the incorporation of NEPA regulation within the project 
plan. For this, the project manager is forced to turn to privately developed guidance. DoD 
project managers are trained to execute the project to defined technical project 
requirements. In the case of environmental impact analysis and planning, these 
documents identify that meeting the technical requirements may be insufficient given the 
social complexities associated with the environmental aspect of the program. To reduce 
project cost and schedule risk, project managers will have to better understand these 
social complexities and this is best done through case studies, and the study of best 
practices and lessons learned such as those presented by the FAA, Eccleston, this thesis, 





III. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACTIVITY IN HAWAII 
A. OVERVIEW 
Federal spending, in particular defense spending, accounts for a significant 
portion of Hawaii’s revenue. The DoD is the second major source of revenue to the state 
of Hawaii, the first is tourism. Hawaii is the 3rd ranking state in per capita federal 
defense expenditures, and Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard is the largest industrial employer 
in Hawaii. With every major defense contractor represented via local staffing in Hawaii, 
DoD projects are integral to the economy of the state of Hawaii (The Chamber of 
Commerce of Hawaii, 2008). There are a number of military installations in the state of 
Hawaii; ten of the largest from each service are listed in Table 3.   
 State of Hawaii Military Installations Table 3.  
Military Installations 
Hickam Air Force Base 
Wheeler Army Airfield 
Fort Shafter 
Pohakuloa Training Area 
Schofield Barracks 
Tripler Army Medical Center 
Coast Guard Integrated Support Command 
Marine Corps Base Hawaii 
Barking Sands Missile Range 
Naval Station Pearl Harbor 
 
The military also has a significant footprint on the islands, with Oahu having the 
largest footprint with just over 20% of the island dedicated to the military. In total, the 
military controls roughly 1.1 million acres of land. Figure 2. shows the land that is 






Figure 2.  Military Land Use in the State of Hawaii (From Webb, 2012) 
In a November 10, 2011, speech by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (Clinton, 
2011) at the East-West Center Honolulu, Hawaii, Clinton addressed several of her points 
in the U.S. foreign policy article, “America’s Pacific Century,” which announced the U.S. 
“pivot” toward Asia, the Pacific and the strategically important Indian Ocean. 
Specifically, Clinton stated that “It is becoming increasingly clear that in the 
21st century, the world’s strategic and economic center of gravity will be the Asia 
Pacific, from the Indian subcontinent to the western shores of the Americas. And one of 





substantially increased investment—diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise—in 
this region.” Clinton called Hawaii “America’s gateway to Asia” and noted that one of 
the six key lines of strategic refocusing action is “forging a broad-based military 
presence.” It is no secret that the United States is executing a strategic shift in focus to the 
Asia-Pacific region, and it is also no secret that this shift includes a broad shift in military 
investment strategy. With Hawaii being the “gateway to Asia” for the U.S., one should 
expect an increased military presence and revenue stream for the state of Hawaii.  
This expectation for increased revenue was met with the Fiscal Year 2013 
Appropriations package. According to the Fiscal Year 2013 Military Construction and 
Veterans Affairs and Homeland Security Appropriations bills, the federal government is 
poised to allocate $366 million for military construction in the State of Hawaii alone.  In 
a time when the federal government and DoD are trying to cut back, this clearly signals 

















 FY 2013 Military Appropriation Construction Hawaii (After Office of Senator Table 4.  
Daniel K. Inouye, 2012) 
Army 
POHAKULOA TRAINING AREA   
     Automated Infantry Platoon Battle Course              $29 million 
  
SCHOFIELD BARRACKS   
     Barracks                                                                  $41 million 
     Barracks                                                                  $55 million 
  
WHEELER ARMY AIR FIELD            
     Combat Aviation Brigade Barracks                         $85 million 
  
Army National Guard 
KAPOLEI 
     Army Aviation Support Facility Ph1                         $28 million 
  
Navy 
KANEOHE BAY (MARINE CORPS BASE HAWAII) 
     Aircraft Staging Area                                               $14.68 million 
     MV-22 Hangar and Infrastructure                            $82.63 million 
  
Air National Guard 
JOINT BASE PEARL HARBOR-HICKAM      
     TFI - F-22 Combat Apron Addition                           $6.5 million 
  
Special Operations Command 
JOINT BASE PEARL HARBOR-HICKAM      
     SOF SDVT-1 Waterfront Operations Facility          $24.289 million     
  
HAWAII Total:                                                                $366.099 million 
 
Each of these projects will require at a minimum an environmental impact 
statement and if they meet one of the triggers discussed in section IV.E, Hawaii 
Environmental Policy Act Distinction, they will have to produce an EA as well as comply 





documentation and communication of that analysis can have serious cost and schedule 
impacts on these and future infrastructure projects in the State of Hawaii.  Current trends 
indicate that the voting public and courts are becoming greater contributors to project 
decisions. Because of the increased attention from the public and the courts, it is 
imperative that the Defense Department Project Managers operating in the state of 
Hawaii have a thorough understanding of both NEPA and HEPA regulations as well as 
an understanding of the Hawaiian culture and associated views of the environment and 
projects that impact that environment.    
B. BIO-FUEL PROJECT 
A potential future DoD infrastructure project that is not documented in the Fiscal 
Year 2013 Authorization bill but deserves special attention is bio-fuel production and 
transportation. This emerging new technology is well aligned with the Navy’s strategic 
objectives and has the potential to impact Hawaii’s economy and environment.  
According to the fact sheet published by the American Security Project 
(Cunningham, 2013), the DoD is the largest single consumer of energy in America, 
consuming 117 million barrels of oil in FY 2011. The Navy, second in consumption 
requirements to the Air Force, accounts for roughly 28% of the department’s fuel use. 
This reliance on oil adds risk to the protection of our nation, as every 25-cent increase in 
the cost of a gallon of fuel costs the DoD an additional one billion dollars per year. Each 
of the services has differing plans to reduce their fuel dependence and associated risk. 
The Navy has set a goal to obtain 50% of the fleet’s liquid fuel from alternative sources 
by the year 2020, and to deploy a “Great Green Fleet” to demonstrate operational capability 
by 2016 (Office of the Secretary of the Navy, 2013). The Navy plans to meet its goals by 
partnering with industry and other government agencies to invest in domestically produced 
biofuels.  
In 2011, the Defense Logistics Agency procured 450,000 gallons of biofuel from 
Dynamic Fuels and Solazyme Corporation (Solazyme, 2011). This fuel was used by the 
Navy in a 50/50 mixture to power their ships and aircraft during the 2012 Rim of the Pacific 





This movement to biofuels is important to the islands of Hawaii for two reasons. The 
first reason is because of the amount of fuel that flows through Naval Station Pearl Harbor. 
Pearl Harbor is homeport for 30 U.S. Navy Ships (U.S. Navy, 2013), significant number of 
aircraft, and is often called on to service and to replenish visiting vessels. With destroyers 
burning roughly 200 gallons of fuel per operating hour (O’Rourke, 2006), this creates a 
significant fuel requirement for the Naval Shipyard. The second reason is the Office of Naval 
Research and the U.S. Department of Agriculture are currently conducting an experiment 
with 35,000 acres of Maui soil, on the Hawaiian Commercial & Sugar plantation, to 
determine whether Maui’s mixture of nutrient rich soil, tropical sun, high rainfall, and native 
plants can produce the Navy’s fuel of the future (Shachtman, 2013). With the Navy planning 
to invest more than half a billion dollars into its biofuel program, success on the island of 
Maui could increase the Defense Department’s contribution to Hawaii’s economy while 
supporting the research and infrastructure development that is required for the state of Hawaii 
to continue to transition their power generating facilities to biofuels.  
If the Navy decides to invest in infrastructure and fuel production in Hawaii, there 
will be significant environmental analyses to be conducted, and because this project would be 
federally funded and use a significant amount of Hawaiian land, the project would be subject 
to NEPA and HEPA regulations. Major infrastructure projects on the Hawaiian Islands have 
a history of significant public scrutiny and long and expensive legal action. For a project such 
as this to be successful, the Defense Department and the State of Hawaii would do well to 
understand and sidestep the pitfalls encountered by other recent infrastructure projects in the 











IV. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 
A. ORIGIN 
Until 1969 the national philosophy regarding environmental impacts due to the 
construction and utilization of infrastructure was to not worry about it during the 
planning stages, build it, and then after the work was completed and negative effects were 
realized, either attribute the ill effects to the cost of progress or attempt to implement 
mitigations after the fact. This philosophy allowed a number of federally funded major 
infrastructure projects to cause significant unrepairable harm to the environment. To 
change this philosophy, the U.S. Congress enacted The National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969. This act essentially mandated that environmental effects will be understood 
and considered during project planning (Bregman, 1999). 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of the NEPA is to cause project managers to think about the 
environmental impacts early in the project’s lifecycle. NEPA by default forces project 
managers to add environmental impacts as a primary factor to the projects’ Analysis of 
Alternatives (AoA) during the early planning stages. For DoD projects that are following 
the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) Systems Engineering Process, this 
consideration for environmental factors begins prior to Milestone A, during the AoA 
scoping and development processes. During the AoA, environmental impacts are 
considered alongside cost, schedule, and quality. Adding the environmental factor to the 
AoA may give rise to a solution that presents lessor impact to the environment or that 
contains environmental mitigation measures as part of the project plan at a cost to the 
other three primary factors.       
C. POLICY 
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 was signed into law by President 





will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to 
promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere 
and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological 
systems and natural resources important to the Nation; and to establish a Council on 
Environmental Quality” (National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 1970). The NEPA 
was enacted to inform stakeholders, to include the public, of the environmental impact, 
impact mitigation measures, to include the cost and schedule impacts of implementing 
those measures, and alternatives to the proposed projects. The NEPA does not prohibit 
federal projects from harming the environment; however there is a growing list of 
legislation that does, such as the Endangered Species Act, The Clean Air Act, The Clean 
Water Act, etc.  
For the study of the cost and schedule risks associated with the EIS, Title I 
Sections 101 and 102, and the establishment of the Council on Environmental Quality in 
Title II are of particular importance. The Act in its entirety can be found in the appendix. 
1. Title I: Congressional Declaration of National Environmental Policy 
Section 101 
Section 101 of the act establishes the responsibility of the Federal Government to 
use “all practical means and measures” to “foster and promote general welfare.” In doing 
so, the act establishes the broad requirement for the Federal Government to be mindful of 
environmental impact. Specifically the act states: 
(A) The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man’s activity on 
the interrelations of all components of the natural environment, 
particularly the profound influences of population growth, high-density 
urbanization, industrial expansion, resource exploitation, and new and 
expanding technological advances and recognizing further the critical 
importance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality to the 
overall welfare and development of man, declares that it is the continuing 
policy of the Federal Government, in cooperation with State and local 
governments, and other concerned public and private organizations, to use 
all practicable means and measures, including financial and technical 
assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general 





can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and 
other requirements of present and future generations of Americans. 
(B) In order to carry out the policy set forth in this Act, it is the continuing 
responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, 
consistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to 
improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources 
to the end that the Nation may -- 
1. fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the 
environment for succeeding generations; 
2. assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and aesthetically 
and culturally pleasing surroundings; 
3. attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without 
degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended 
consequences; 
4. preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national 
heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports 
diversity, and variety of individual choice; 
5. achieve a balance between population and resource use which will 
permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and 
6. enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum 
attainable recycling of depletable resources. 
(C) The Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a healthful 
environment and that each person has a responsibility to contribute to the 
preservation and enhancement of the environment. (National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 1970) 
2. Title I: Congressional Declaration of National Environmental Policy 
Section 102 
Section 102 establishes how the Federal Government will meet the requirements 
established in Section 101.  
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) 
the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be 
interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in 





(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the 
integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental 
design arts in planning and in decision making which may have an impact 
on man's environment; 
(B) identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation with the 
Council on Environmental Quality established by title II of this Act, which 
will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values 
may be given appropriate consideration in decision making along with 
economic and technical considerations; (National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969, 1970) 
Of particular importance to the study of the EIS, Section 102.C established the 
requirement to produce a report detailing the proposed projects environmental impacts. 
This statement is known as the Environmental Impact Statement.  
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation 
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on -- 
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the 
proposal be implemented, 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, 
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment 
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and 
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which 
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. 
(National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 1970) 
In implementation, the requirement to prepare an EIS was reserved for “major Federal 
actions” however it is important to note that since 1970, “major Federal actions” has been 
expanded to include projects that the federal government has allocated funds to or has 





3. Title II: Council on Environmental Quality 
Title II establishes the Council on Environmental Quality. The act establishes this 
council and its Chair as the advisor to the President for environmental matters, and as 
importantly, this act authorizes the Council to develop the “Regulations for Implementing 
the Procedural Provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act” (Council on 
Environmental Quality, 1978). These regulations are what establish the process for 
environmental analysis and the required contents of the EIS.  
D. REGULATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PROCEDURAL 
PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 
In 1978 the Council on Environmental Quality published the Regulations for 
Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act. Part 
1502 of these regulations define the Environmental Impact Statement and its content 
requirements. The regulations identify the purpose of the EIS as, “to serve as an action-
forcing device to insure that the policies and goals defined in the Act are infused into the 
ongoing programs and actions of the federal government.” The policy further states that 
the EIS “shall provide full and fair discussion of significant environmental impacts and 
shall inform decision makers and the public of the reasonable alternatives which would 
avoid or minimize adverse impacts or enhance the quality of the human environment” 
Finally, the policy states that the EIS “shall be used by federal officials in conjunction 
with other relevant material to plan actions and make decision” (Council on 
Environmental Quality, 1978). 
Section 1502 then outlines the complete requirement set for the EIS as shown in 











1502.3 Statutory requirements for statements 
1502.4 Major federal actions requiring the preparation of environmental impact statements 
1502.5 Timing 
1502.6 Interdisciplinary preparation 
1502.7 Page limits 
1502.8 Writing 
1502.9 Draft, final, and supplemental statements 
1502.1 Recommended format 
1502.11 Cover sheet 
1502.12 Summary 
1502.13 Purpose and need 
1502.14 Alternatives including the proposed action 
1502.15 Affected environment 
1502.16 Environmental consequences 
1502.17 List of preparers 
1502.18 Appendix 
1502.19 Circulation of the environmental impact statement 
1502.20 Tiering 
1502.21 Incorporation by reference 
1502.22 Incomplete or unavailable information 
1502.23 Cost-benefit analysis 
1502.24 Methodology and scientific accuracy 







1. Primary Areas of Consideration 
Within the EIS requirements, the most substantial sections are Sections 1502.14 
and 1502.16. Section 1502.14 identifies the agency requirement to: 
(a) Rigorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives, 
and for alternatives which were eliminated from detailed study, briefly 
discuss the reasons for their having been eliminated. 
(b) Devote substantial treatment to each alternative considered in detail 
including the proposed action so that reviewers may evaluate their 
comparative merits. 
(c) Include reasonable alternatives not within the jurisdiction of the lead 
agency. 
(d) Include the alternative of no action. 
(e) Identify the agency’s preferred alternative or alternatives, if one or 
more exists, in the draft statement and identify such alternative in the final 
statement unless another law prohibits the expression of such a preference. 
(f) Include appropriate mitigation measures not already included in the 
proposed action or alternatives. (Council on Environmental Quality, 1978) 
Section 1502.16 identifies the agency requirement to include a discussion on “the 
environmental impacts of the alternatives including the proposed action, any adverse 
environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, the 
relationship between short-term uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and 
enhancement of long-term productivity, and any irreversible or irretrievable 
commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposal should it be 
implemented.” 
The Council of Environmental Quality has developed an extensive set of 
requirements and guidelines for projects to follow when planning and conducting 
environmental analysis and decision review. However, even when a project develops a 
plan to address each of the requirements, various interpretations of these requirements 





requirements listed in 1502.14 the interpretation of the terms rigorously, objectively, 
reasonable, substantial, and appropriate are often the center of these lawsuits 
E. HAWAII ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT DISTINCTION 
Several states to include the state of Hawaii have passed their own environmental 
impact statement legislation. This legislation is passed to refine the regulations as 
outlined in the NEPA and to provide a process for environmental review of non-federally 
funded projects.  
The Hawaii Environmental Policy Act, fashioned after the NEPA, was signed into 
Hawaiian law in 1974. The HEPA includes the statutes and administrative rules found in 
Hawaii Revised Statute (HRS) Chapter 343, Environmental Impact Statements; Hawaii 
Administrative Rule 11-200, Environmental Impact Statement Rules; and Hawaii 
Administrative Rule 11-201, Environmental Council Rules of Practice and Procedure 
(State of Hawaii Office of Environmental Quality Control, 2012). Although the HEPA is 
fashioned after the NEPA, the HEPA differs from the NEPA in three distinct ways which 
are shown in Table 6.   
 HEPA vs. NEPA (After State of Hawaii Table 6.  
Office of Environmental Quality Control, 2012) 
HEPA NEPA 
Separates disclosures from the permitting and 
implementation processes 
Constitutes a process that is under the oversight 
of one federal agency from start to finish 
Draws a distinct boundary between the 
disclosure process and the implementation or 
permitting process  
Does not draw a distinct boundary between the 
disclosure process and the implementation or 
permitting process 
Reviews triggered by any of nine factors Reviews triggered by major federal action 







The most substantial of the differences is that the State requirements can be 
applicable to projects that are not State funded, if it meets one of the nine trigger factors. 
The nine factors that trigger reviews along with the responsible agency are found in Table 
7.  For additional guidance to include exclusions refer to the State of Hawaii Office of 
Environmental Quality Control’s HEPA implementation guide (State of Hawaii 
Office of Environmental Quality Control, 2012). 
 HEPA Triggers (After State of Hawaii Table 7.  
Office of Environmental Quality Control, 2012) 
Trigger Responsible Agency 
1 Use of state or county lands or funds Agency that is using funds or holds land 
title 
2 Use of land classified as a conservation 
district 
Department of Land and Natural 
Resources 
3 Use of land within a shoreline County planning department 
4 Use of land within a historical site County planning department 
5 Use of land within the Waikiki area City and county of Honolulu 
6 Amendments to existing county general plans 
where the amendment would result in 
designations other than agriculture, 
conservation or prevention 
County planning department 
7 Any reclassification of land classified as a 
conservation district 
Land Use Commission 
8 Construction or modification of helicopter 
facilities that affect lands classified as a 
conservative district, a shoreline area, or a 
historic site 
County planning department 
9 Proposal of a Wastewater treatment, Waste to 
energy facility, Landfill, Oil refinery, or 
Power generating facility 
 
State or county government agency that 






Since all DoD projects utilize federal funds, they are required to comply with 
NEPA. If the project meets one of the nine factors shown in Table 7.  then it will also be 
subject to HEPA requirements. The majority of the requirements are common between 
the HEPA and the NEPA and to reduce the burden of executing two processes Section 
343-5(f) of the HRS states that “whenever an action is subject to both the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969…. And the requirements of [Chapter 343, HRS] the 
agencies shall cooperate with federal agencies to the fullest extent possible” 
(State of Hawaii Office of Environmental Quality Control, 2012). In addition, the 
Regulations for Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National Environmental 
Policy Act states that “Agencies shall cooperate with state and local agencies to the fullest 
extent possible to reduce duplication between NEPA and state and local requirements, 
unless the agencies are specifically barred from doing so by some other law” (Council on 
Environmental Quality, 1978). With regard to the EIS, when comparing the specific 
requirements of the EIS as defined by the U.S. Council of Environmental Quality and the 
Hawaii Office of Environmental Quality Control, there are no substantive differences. 







 State and Federal EIS Content (After: Council on Environmental Quality, 1978 Table 8.  
and State of Hawaii Office of Environmental Quality Control, 2012)  
Hawaii Federal 
Concise summary and table of contents Summary and table of contents 
Statement of purpose for the project Discussion on the purpose of and need for action 
Detailed project description including maps, 
technical data, economic and cultural effects and 
historical perspective 
Devote substantial treatment to each alternative 
considered in detail including the proposed action 
so that reviewers may evaluate their comparative 
merits. 
Analysis of alternatives to the proposed project and 
an explanation why the alternatives were rejected 
Rigorously explore and objectively evaluate all 
reasonable alternatives, and for alternatives which 
were eliminated from detailed study, briefly discuss 
the reasons for their having been eliminated. 
Description of the environmental setting Discussion of affected environment 
Statement of the relationship of the proposed 
action to land use plans, policies and controls for 
the affected area 
Possible conflicts between the proposed action and 
the objectives of federal, regional, state, and local 
(and in the case of a reservation, Indian tribe) land 
use plans, policies and controls for the area 
concerned 
Description of the probable impacts of the project 
including the direct, indirect and cumulative 
impacts, as well as impacts on both the natural and 
human environments 
Discussion of the Direct, indirect, and cumulative 
impacts 
Description of the relationship between short‐term 
uses of environmental resources and long‐term 
productivity (sustainability analysis) 
Discussion of the relationship between short-term 
uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and 
enhancement of long-term productivity 
A statement of the unavoidable environmental 
impacts caused by the project and a rationale for 
proceeding with the project in light of these 
impacts 
Discussion will include the environmental impacts 
of the alternatives including the proposed action, 
any adverse environmental effects which cannot be 
avoided should the proposal be implemented 
A consideration of all mitigation measures 
proposed to avoid, minimize, rectify, or reduce the 
project’s adverse impacts 
Means to mitigate adverse environmental impacts  
A summary of unresolved issues and a discussion 
of how such issues will be resolved Not Specified 
Listing of all agencies, organizations and 
individuals consulted during the preparation of the 
document 
List of preparers 
Reproduction of all substantive comments received 
during the study process and the responses to those 
comments 
All substantive comments received on the draft 






Although the content requirements for the EIS are similar, there is a procedural 
difference when executing the Federal and State processes. When executing both 
processes, the State requires that the project develop a final EA even if it is believed that 
the action will require an EIS. The substantive requirements for the EA are similar to that 
of the EIS while scoped at a level of detail, and finality commensurate with the early 
project phase. The requirements for the EA are shown in Table 9.   
 EA Substantive Content (After State of Hawaii Table 9.  
Office of Environmental Quality Control, 2012) 
EA Substantive Content 
Agencies, citizens groups, and Individuals consulted in the 
early stages 
Proposed action with respect to its technical, economic, 
social and environmental characteristics 
Description of affected environment 
Discussion of the direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts 
Measures to mitigate direct, indirect, and cumulative 
impacts 
Determination based upon analysis of significance 
Rationale for determination 
Agencies to be consulted in preparation of the EIS 
Required permits and approval 
Written comments from early comment period 
 
Hawaii’s process is constructed to allow for a comment period following the 
release of a draft EA and then a final EA that addresses the comments. In the case where 
both NEPA and HEPA regulations apply, the agency can forgo the development of a 
draft EA and submit the final EA for the 30-day public comment period. Then the agency 
can follow with the draft EIS which addresses the comments in the final EA, provide a 
45-day comment period for the draft EIS in accordance with HEPA and NEPA, and then 





either the HEPA or NEPA implementing instructions, but substantive comments based 
upon new information received during the 30-day waiting period may require a 
supplement to the final EIS. 
F. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GUIDANCE 
The DoD has also developed guidance for the implementation of NEPA 
requirements into the project management plan. This guidance is available from DAU 
and is contained within the Environmental Safety and Occupational Health subject area. 
As with the other implementation guidance, the DoD guidance stresses the need to start 
early. “It is important to initiate NEPA planning as early in the acquisition process as 
possible to ensure resulting analyses are an integral component of the systems 
engineering process.  Early planning can prevent unexpected issues during the lifecycle 
of the project” (Defense Acquisition University, 2013). For DoD projects this means 
starting prior to Milestone A as shown in Figure 3.  
 






In addition to starting early, the DoD guidance identifies the need to continue to 
revise the NEPA analysis through the engineering, manufacturing, and development 
phase, and the need for the environmental impact to be an element in the alternative 
decisions. “Beginning with the materiel solution analysis and technology development 
during pre-systems acquisition activities and continuing with engineering and 
manufacturing development, decisions are continually being made which impact the 
characteristics of the system.  NEPA requires that the evaluation of environmental effects 
of the proposed action and reasonable alternatives be completed before decisions are 
made that would prejudice selection of an alternative to the proposed action” (Defense 
Acquisition University, 2013). To ensure that the costs associated with appropriate 
environmental review are understood and included within the program plan, the DoD 
requires that NEPA requirements be included in the Program Objective Memorandum. 
“An essential action of the PM is to ensure NEPA requirements are integrated into the 
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) building process, a source of allocating 
adequate funding to support NEPA analysis, documentation, and mitigation” (Defense 
Acquisition University, 2013). 
DAU also provides a NEPA analysis and documentation guide which is 
summarized in Figure 4.  This guide provides the basic requirements associated with EA 
and EIS preparation. The guidance is not sufficient to support detailed environmental 
analysis planning. For more specific guidance, program managers would need to refer to 
the Council on Environmental Quality’s Regulations for Implementing the Procedural 





















V. CASE STUDIES 
A. HONOLULU RAIL TRANSIT 
1. Project Background 
The United States Department of Transportation Federal Transit Administration 
(FTA) and the City and County of Honolulu Department of Transportation Services 
(DTS) are executing a project that is envisioned to provide public transit service on the 
island of Oahu. The project is planned to connect the east and west of the southern part of 
the island, extending from Kapolei to the University of Hawaii at Manoa and Waikiki. As 
you can see from Figure 5. Oahu automobile registrations have tracked fairly well to the 
population, nearly doubling between 1960 and 2010. Vehicle miles driven, on the other 
hand, have increased by a factor of five in the same period.  
 
Figure 5.  Population, Vehicle Ownership, and Vehicle Miles Traveled on Oahu (From 





This increase in vehicle and road use has earned Honolulu the honor of being the 
city with the worst traffic in America (Gorzelany, 2012). The increase in demand was 
initially met through the development of the H-1 freeway in the 1950s, but by the 1960s, 
public opposition to the expansion of the freeway system combined with lack of funds, 
and environmental impacts forced the abandonment of an elevated Makai freeway 
between Kalihi and Mōʻiliʻili (U.S DOT FTA and City and County of Honolulu DTS, 
2010). 
In 1967, an island wide transportation study found that a fixed guideway transit 
system could provide low-cost transportation to meet increasing transportation demands. 
In the early 1970s, the Preliminary Engineering and Evaluation Program (PEEP) phase-
one and phase-two studies further evaluated the fixed guideway transit option. These 
studies lead the city and county of Honolulu to start the Honolulu Area Rail Rapid 







Figure 6.  HART Project Route and Station Map (From Daniel Mann, Johnson & 
Mendenhall, 1974) 
In the early 1980s, after changes in administration and priorities at both the local 
and federal level, the project was stopped. In the mid-1980s, the project was restarted 
under the name Honolulu Rapid Transit Development. The project started where the 
HART project left off and added some new automation techniques to the solution. This 
project was halted in 1992 because the Honolulu City Council voted down the measure 
that would have generated the project’s needed funds through a general exercise tax. In 
1998, the city looked into a lower cost and impact approach that would have made use of 
existing infrastructure. This project was called the Trans 2K Islandwide Mobility Concept 
Plan. The project completed a draft EIS in 2000 and some of the project’s facilities were 
completed, but the project was abandoned shortly after Honolulu Mayor Mufi 





once again resurrected as the Honolulu High-Capacity Transit Corridor Project 
(HHCTCP). By 2005, with traffic significantly worse than in 1992, the Honolulu City 
Council supported a general exercise tax to fund the transit project. In 2005, the DTS 
published a notice of intent to publish a draft EIS. 
Upon completion of the analysis of alternatives, the Honolulu City Council 
selected the fixed guideway option as the locally preferred alternative. The draft EIS was 
published in November of 2008 and the Final EIS followed in June of 2010. On 19 
December 2013, the Full Funding Grant Agreement for the HHCTCP currently referred 
to as the Honolulu Rail Transit Project (HRTP) was awarded by the FTA and was 
executed by the city and county of Honolulu.  
2. Project Summary 
According to the Honolulu Rail Transit Project Overview (HART, 2012), the 
HRTP is a 20 mile elevated rail line with 21 stations that will connect West Oahu with 
downtown Honolulu and Ala Moana Center via Honolulu International Airport, shown in 
Figure 7. , with potential future expansions to other parts of West Oahu, Salt Lake, UH 
Manoa, and Waikiki. The transit system will feature steel wheeled trains each carrying 
hundreds of passengers. It is anticipated that by 2030 the system will make over 100,000 
trips per day and take roughly 40,000 vehicles off the road. The project is anticipated to 






Figure 7.  Honolulu Rail Transit Project Map (From HART, 2012) 
3. Litigation  
The groundbreaking for the project was planned for the fourth quarter of calendar 
year 2009 but was pushed back multiple times until the first quarter of calendar year 2011 
due to delays in the project review process, federal permitting, and approval of the EIS.  
On December 27, 2005 the FTA published a Notice Of Intent (NOI) to prepare an 
Analysis of Alternatives and an Environmental Impact Statement. In this process the city 
reviewed four alternatives, and concluded that the fixed guideway alternative was the 
only alternative that met the project’s need. The FTA then published a second NOI to 
prepare an EIS on 15 March 2007. Following nearly a year of public comment, in 
February 2008, the city council approved the steel on steel alternative which voters 
supported as demonstrated by their approval of a city charter establishing the steel on 
steel system. The city then prepared a draft and Final EIS (FEIS) which were released in 
November of 2008 and June of 2010 respectively. Five years after the initial NOI was 






In May of 2011 a federal suit was filed alleging that on 23 counts the FEIS and 
ROD approving the project did not comply with the requirements of NEPA, Section 4(f) 
of the Department of Transportation Act, the National Historic Prevention Act (NHPA), 
and the regulations implementing the acts. The Plaintiffs claimed that FTA violated 
NEPA by: failing to properly define the scope of the project thus “unduly” restricting the 
scope of the NEPA analysis, failing to properly evaluate all alternatives and associated 
environmental impacts, and considering only a subset of the heavy rail alternatives. The 
Plaintiffs also claimed that the FTA failed to meet the requirements of HEPA by: failing 
to identify and evaluate the use of Hawaiian burial and cultural properties, evaluating the 
use of HEPA resources in an “arbitrary and capricious fashion”, and illegally approving 
the project with the availability of feasible alternatives and measures that would minimize 
harm to HEPA protected resources. Finally the Plaintiffs claimed that the FTA failed to 
meet NHPA requirements by not fully evaluating Hawaiian burial and cultural properties 
prior to approval (Honolulutraffic.com vs. FTA; Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ 
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, 2011). 
In November of 2012 the court ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs on three of the 23 
counts finding that the FTA: “arbitrarily and capriciously failed to complete reasonable 
efforts to identify above-ground TCPs prior to issuing the ROD”, failed to adequately 
“consider the Beretania Street Tunnel alternative prior to eliminating it as imprudent”, 
and failed to adequately “consider whether the Project will constructively use Mother 
Waldron Park” (Honolulutraffic.com et all vs. FTA; Order on Cross-Motions, 2012). The 
ruling required the project to go back and rework some of the details of the alternatives 
analysis, but because it only impacted phase 4 of the project, allowing work on phases 1-
3 to continue as scheduled while the analysis is conducted.  
While this case was proceeding, the state of Hawaii, city of Honolulu and county 
of Honolulu were in the Hawaiian Supreme Court defending their decision to approve the 
rail project with the intent of conducting archaeological inventory surveys prior to 
commencing work on each project phase instead of conducting the survey against the 





Kaleikini vs. the state of Hawaii, city of Honolulu and county of Honolulu (Paulette 
Kaanohiokalani Kaleikini vs. Wayne Yoshioka, 2012)  the plaintiff alleged that the 
defendants violated Hawaii Revised Statutes chapters 6E, 343, and 205A by not 
completing an archaeological inventory survey for the entire project prior to project 
approval, and thus “foreclosing” later phase options that might have a lesser impact. In 
August of 2011 the Circuit Court of the First Circuit granted summary judgment in the 
favor of the defendants, but in 2012 the Superior Court found in favor of the Plaintiff on 
counts one through four, specifically finding that the defendants did not comply with the 
rules implementing Hawaii Revised Statutes chapters 6E-8 and 6E-42, while they did 
comply with HEPA and land use statutes. This ruling effectively stopped construction 
until the studies could be completed, costing the five billion project an estimated 114 
million dollars (Pacific Business News, 2012). Taking the planned $107 million dollar 
budget for EIS development and adding the $114 million dollar cost for delays and 
analysis as a result of the archeological ruling, barring additional litigation, the project 
has spent roughly 5% of the budget on the EIS and in meeting land use requirements. 
4. Current Status 
As of January 2013, the project continued design, planning and engineering for all 
phases, the FTA and city of Honolulu signed a 1.5 billion dollar funding agreement in 
December of 2012, and the project was reporting that the archaeological work was ahead 
of schedule. Project completion was scheduled for initial operation in 2016 and full 
operation in 2019.  
5. Lessons Learned 
With a price tag of over five billion dollars, the rail project is a significant 
undertaking for the state of Hawaii and county of Honolulu. Reviewing project 
documentation which is well organized and publicly available via the Honolulu Rail 
Transit website (Honolulu Authority for Rapid Transportation, 2013) it is clear that a 





land use regulations. Even with the level of planning commensurate with a five billion 
dollar plus project, construction in support of the rail project, as of January 2013, was at a 
standstill. The project made a valid attempt to allow for and address public comments, 
providing over a year for public comment on the draft EIS. The project also executed a 
significant communication strategy via newsletters, town-hall meetings, public 
presentations, and a well-designed website.  
These efforts were successful in shaping public opinion as evidenced by the 
approval of a general excise tax to fund the project, and the result of the 2008 ballot 
measure asking the voters whether the city should have the authority to conduct a steel-
on-steel transit system. Unfortunately, following the 2008 approval, the rail project has 
not done enough to engage the public. In support of the EIS development phase between 
2009 and 2010, the project spent roughly $1 million per year on public outreach for items 
such as those shown in Table 10.   
 Project Outreach Activities (After Kalani, 2010) Table 10.  
Outreach Activities 





Radio spots, including a weekly talk show 
Newspapers adds 
Hotline Staffing 
Question answering via email and web 
Monthly television show 
Public hearings 
Project DVD with an animated fly-over 
 
$2 million may sound like a sizable amount of funding for public outreach; however, for 
a project with a $108 million budget for EIS development, $2 million only accounts for 





spent by an 18 mile commuter rail project in Denver, which according to the Denver 
Regional Transportation District, is on the low end of their 10-20% spectrum (Kalani, 
2010). Regardless of the percentage spent, it is clear that the Honolulu project should 
have invested more in its public outreach program. With construction delays costing the 
program tens of millions, the risk analysis should have identified the need to invest this 
money in communication vice litigation and construction delays.  
Another lesson learned is that all documented options within the analysis of 
alternatives should be equally evaluated to avoid the later claim that one or more options 
were not as carefully evaluated. This project demonstrates that the courts have assumed 
the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of project planning efforts based 
not upon the project planning efforts themselves but on the testimony of each side. In this 
case, the court did not feel that appropriate or reasonable consideration was given to all of 
the alternatives. Unfortunately for project managers, allowing lawyers and judges to 
make this determination may force the project into incurring additional expense to fully 
consider options that could otherwise be dismissed through preliminary analysis.  
NEPA and HEPA requirements also provide the platform for the public to 
question the adherence to other Hawaiian Statutes. As was demonstrated by the Hawaiian 
Supreme Court ruling, land use analysis of all project phases should be completed prior 
to the start of construction. To reduce schedule for large infrastructure projects, it is often 
advantageous to award contracts and begin construction on one phase while the planning 
for another phase is ongoing. This ruling, however, demonstrates that if construction on 
one phase has the potential to limit more environmentally friendly options for another 
phase, it can be argued that the environmental analysis has to be completed for the entire 
project before any construction can commence.  
The final lesson learned, a common one, is if those that do not agree with your 
project for any reason, environmental or otherwise have sufficient resources, they will 
interfere with your project via environmental compliance. Project managers should 





B. HAWAII SUPERFERRY 
1. Project Background 
In 2003, founders Timothy Dick, John Garibaldi, and Robert White announced 
plans to develop a daily high-speed ferry route between Honolulu on Oahu, Nawiliwili on 
Kauai, and Kahului on Maui. In 2004 the company entered into negotiation with the state 
Department of Transportation with a plan to begin service in 2007. In April of 2004 the 
United States House of Representatives passed a $275 billion highway bill that included 
$62 million for ferry service in Hawaii and Alaska.  
 
Figure 8.  Hawaii Superferry (From Paiva, 2008) 
In October of 2004, the state’s plan to add dock and shipping facilities within 
Kahului Harbor met opposition from the surfing and canoe paddling community. In 
February of 2005, environmental interest groups joined forces with Kaua'i County 
Council, Maui’s Mayor, and shipping company officials to push for an EIS. At the same 
time, a Senate bill mandating an EIS was making it through the legislative process. The 
senate bill was killed in March of 2005, and in July of 2005 Maui Circuit Court Judge 





the Kahului Harbor Coalition demanding an EIS, noting that the groups had no standing 
to bring the lawsuit and that the Hawaii Department of Transportation had properly 
followed environmental law (Honolulu Advertiser Staff, 2007). The case was then 
brought to United States District Court only to be again dismissed in September of 2005. 
On August 26, 2007 Hawaii Superferry Inc began service between Honolulu, Kahului, 
and Nawiliwili. The Superferry’s initial attempt to dock in Nawiliwili was blocked by 
protesters, forcing it to turn back to Honolulu. Shortly after service began, it was halted 
when the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that the Department of Transportation erred when 
they exempted harbor improvements required for ferry operation from environmental 
review.  In November 2007 the state passed a law, Act 2, allowing the ferry to operate 
while the EIS was developed. Environmentalist groups and shipping officials again 
appealed to the Hawaii Supreme court and it ruled in their favor in May of 2009 stating 
“DOT simply did not recognize its duty to consider both the primary and secondary 
impacts of the Superferry project on the environment ... DOT wholly abandoned that duty 
by issuing an erroneous exemption to Superferry” and that in accordance with Chapter 
343 the Superferry could not operate while the EIS was under development. The 
Superferry filed for bankruptcy protection in July of 2009. 
2. Project Failure 
The primary factor that led to the Superferry failure was the use of exemptions to 
navigate around the EA and EIS requirements. Regardless of the validity of the 
exemptions, the fact that they were used opened the door for litigation, and increased 
public scrutiny of the project. Although cost and schedule impacts for conducting the 
studies would have been high at project onset, the cost and schedule impacts after service 
initiation were unmanageable and the project had to be terminated. There were essentially 
three environmental impacts that the courts ultimately decided the project needed to 
evaluate: the use of the Superferry for interisland transport, the construction associated 
with harbor improvements required to dock the Superferry, and the use of the harbor 
improvement in conjunction with the Superferry. These areas of evaluation were closely 





first area of concern was impacts to marine life, in particular whale strikes which was to 
be covered under the environmental impact of the Superferry’s operation, the potential 
for increased movement of invasive species, to be covered under the use of the harbor 
improvements by the Superferry, and increased neighbor island traffic also to be covered 
under the use of the harbor improvements by the Superferry. 
a. Harbor Improvements 
The State of Hawaii allocated a total of $40 million in state funds for 
improvements to the four harbors that were to be used by the Superferry project (The 
Sierra Club vs. the Department of Transportation of The State of Hawaii, 2007).  
 
Figure 9.  Harbor Improvements (From RedMaui.com) 
The use of state funds for harbor improvement correctly triggered the EA process and the 
DOT developed a draft EA in June of 2004. In accordance with the HEPA’s provisions 
for exemption, the DOT consulted with Hawaii’s Office of Environmental Quality 





stated that “[t]he actions generally fall under exemption class 6 number 8 and exemption 
class 8 number 1 of DOT‘s approved exemption list” (The Sierra Club vs. the 
Department of Transportation of The State of Hawaii, 2007). This statement then paved 
the way for the exemption process, given that the improvements were minor and they 
only served to allow the Superferry the ability to use the harbor for what it was intended 
for. 
What the DOT failed to properly evaluate within the exemption process 
were the secondary impacts that would arise through the use of the harbor improvements 
by the Superferry. The Supreme court of Hawaii ruled in 2007 in favor of the plaintiff 
stating: “The exemption was erroneously granted as DOT considered only the physical 
improvements to Kahului harbor in isolation and did not consider the secondary impacts 
on the environment,” therefore, finding that the DOT did not appropriately follow the 
process, thus forcing them to conduct an EA, and closing the harbor for use by the 
Superferry. 
b. Ferry Operation 
Despite the need to conduct a comprehensive EA of secondary ferry 
impacts associated with the pier improvements to satisfy the requirements of HEPA, it 
was found that Superferry Inc. needed to conduct an EIS in accordance with NEPA. The 
NEPA process was applicable based upon the $140 million in federally guaranteed loans 
and the permit issued to the Superferry by the United States Department of 
Transportation (Department of Transportation, 2007). 
3. Lessons Learned 
Public concern over environmental issues can grow and spread quickly on the 
Hawaiian Islands, and the perception that the project is attempting to skirt environmental 
documentation requirements will only increase the public’s concern over the project’s 
potential environmental impacts. The purpose of both NEPA and HEPA policies is to put 





communication process early in a project lifecycle is essential to reduce future project 
cost and schedule risk. Not only is this a lessoned learned and best practice, for projects 
subjected to NEPA regulations it is a requirement. “An agency shall commence 
preparation of an environmental impact statement as close as possible to the time the agency 
is developing or is presented with a proposal (§1508.23) so that preparation can be 
completed in time for the final statement to be included in any recommendation or report on 
the proposal.  The statement shall be prepared early enough so that it can serve practically as 
an important contribution to the decision making process and will not be used to rationalize 
or justify decisions already made.” The Council of Environmental Quality goes on to state 
that “For projects directly undertaken by federal agencies the environmental impact 
statement shall be prepared at the feasibility analysis (go-no go) stage and may be 
supplemented at a later stage if necessary (Council on Environmental Quality, 1978). For 
DoD projects following the DAU Systems Engineering Process, this means documenting 
and communicating the alternatives during the conduct of the AoA prior to Milestone A. For 
Department of the Navy (DON) projects, the requirement to start this process early is also 
codified in Code of Federal Regulations Title 32: Part 775 (U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 2013).    
If the project is being executed as a sub-project, cumulative effects of the parent 
project must be evaluated. 
Commitment to financing before environmental documentation is in place should 
be avoided. These financial commitments place schedule constraints on the project 
making legal delays an obvious tactic for those that oppose the project.       
C. OUTRIGGER TELESCOPE PROJECT 
1. Background 
Mauna Kea is a volcano on the island of Hawaii. The peak of Mauna Kea at 
nearly 14,000 feet above sea level is the highest point in the state of Hawaii. Because of 
the stable dry atmosphere above the volcano, being above the inversion layer, and the 





observation location. In addition to its astronomical viewing properties, in Hawaiian 
mythology, the peaks of the island are sacred, and Mauna Kea one of the most sacred. 
Mauna Kea is also home to several endangered species, many of which have become 
endangered due to invasive species introduced when Europeans arrived on the islands in 
the 18th century. Given its scientific properties, sacred nature, and refuge for endangered 
species, Mauna Kea has had its share of environmental and legal challenges, a recent one 
being the addition of six telescopes to the existing 13 that already populated the summit. 
 
Figure 10.  Eleven of the 13 Telescopes on the Mauna Kea Summit (From Environmental 
News Service, 2006) 
The Outrigger Telescope project was part of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration’s (NASA) program to develop ground-based interferometry. The project, 
if completed, would have addressed all six of NASA’s scientific objectives for ground 
based interferometry (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2005). The two 
existing telescopes Keck I and Keck II along with the Keck-Keck Interferometer which 
linked the two 10 meter telescopes together, allowed NASA to meet two of the six 





to six additional “outrigger” telescopes, which measured about one-third the size of the 
existing telescopes. 
 
Figure 11.  Concept of Four Outrigger Telescopes around the Existing Two Keck 
Telescopes (From Environmental News Service, 2006) 
2. Project Failure 
Since the additional telescopes were part of the overall project, NASA believed 
that the already produced EA was sufficient to move forward with the installation of the 
additional telescopes, which NASA had already built at a cost of $15 million. The Office 
of Hawaiian Affairs did not agree and filed suit against NASA seeking an injunction until 
NASA conducted an EIS as a follow-on to the already completed EA. The Office of 
Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) was created by the 1978 Hawaii State Constitutional 
Convention. The Office is a semi-autonomous entity of the state of Hawaii with the 
mission to “protect Hawaii’s people and environmental resources and OHA's assets, 
toward ensuring the perpetuation of the culture, the enhancement of lifestyle and the 
protection of entitlements of Native Hawaiians, while enabling the building of a strong 
and healthy Hawaiian people and nation, recognized nationally and internationally” 
(Office of Hawaiian Affairs , 2013).  The Office is considered one of the most influential 
groups on the island, and when it comes to infrastructure development, they are a group 





agreed with the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, stating that NASA's EA "fails as a whole to 
recognize and consider the past actions on the summit of Mauna Kea," and “because 
there is no previous EIS or EA that encompasses the site of the outrigger telescopes’ 
project, NASA's obligation to consider the cumulative impacts of development at the 
Keck observatory is correspondingly greater” (Tytell, 2003). Without a choice, NASA 
then agreed to develop a full EIS that would encompass both the impacts of the outrigger 
addition and the cumulative impacts of all the past activity at the site. While the EIS was 
in development, in 2000 the University of Hawaii and the Office of Hawaiian Affairs 
revised the summit’s master plan to allow 19 domes, where the existing master plan 
approved in 1983 called for no more than 13 domes atop Mauna Kea, enabling the state 
land board to allow the project to proceed. This decision was met with another suit filed 
by Mauna Kea Anaina Hou, the Royal Order of Kamehameha I, and the Sierra Club's 
Hawai'i Chapter (Dayton, 2004). The EIS was completed in 2005 and NASA found that 
“From a cumulative perspective, the impact of past, present, and reasonably foreseeable 
future activities on cultural and biological resources is substantial, adverse and 
significant....In general, the Outrigger Telescopes Project would add a small incremental 
impact” (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2005). Regardless of the 
second suit, after spending roughly two million dollars on an EIS, in 2006, NASA 
canceled the program citing budget cuts. 
3. Lessons Learned 
As with the Superferry program, it was again found that the cumulative impacts 
were not adequately covered in the EA. In the case of the Superferry, cumulative referred 
to the harbor improvements combined with the ferry operation, and in the case of the 
Outrigger project, it was the new construction combined with previous construction. This 
case study demonstrates that under Hawaiian environmental impact assessment 
requirements, projects can be held to evaluating environmental impacts not just from the 
time of project initiation, but also from the time that significant environmental impact 





Cultural impacts need to be equally considered. For this project, the actual 
environmental impacts were minimal; arguably the plans outlined in the EIS if executed 
would have relieved some of the previous environmental impact. For this project, the 
cultural impacts were the primary driver to litigation. Cultural impacts for projects on the 
Hawaiian Islands should not be dismissed in hopes that they can be addressed in 






A. COMMON THEMES 
In each of the three case studies, there were varying levels of resources invested 
in complying with the NEPA and HEPA, various agencies at the city, county, state and 
federal level that were involved with authoring and approving environmental analysis, 
and varying stumbling blocks that halted progress or led to project failure. Even with 
these variables there are common themes that can be gleaned from these studies.  
The most significant common theme is if an individual or party does not support 
an infrastructure project and they have sufficient financial resources, they will be 
successful in establishing cause to bring suit against the project under either the NEPA or 
HEPA regulations. This individual or party can be a concerned citizen, a citizen group, an 
environmental group, a state or local agency, or a competing business interest. As 
demonstrated by the Superferry Project, competing business interests may have a 
significant amount to lose as a result of project success and their financial resources, 
coupled with environmental and cultural activism, can quickly push a project to failure. 
Another significant common theme is that if a court rules in favor of the project 
and the quality of the environmental and land use documentation, it is really only the 
beginning of the process in regards to the courts dissecting the quality of the project’s 
analysis. A project manager can count on either the case going to appeal or the plaintiffs 
taking a slightly different angle, utilizing lessons learned from past court proceedings 
regarding the project, and returning to the same court. When you couple the vast array of 
environmental, cultural, archaeological, and historical regulations in the state of Hawaii 
with the impact that any significant infrastructure project brings, there are essentially 
endless possibilities for bringing a project to court. This fact was clear in the nearly 
endless litigation surrounding the H-3 interstate project. The H-3 project was a federally 
funded highway connecting H-1 near Pearl Harbor to Marine Corps Base Hawaii. Orders 





construction did not start until the 1980s. The project was finished in 1997. In total the 
project took nearly 40 years, cost 1.3 Billion dollars, and was only 16 miles long (Yuen, 
2013). During one of the many court cases over the H-3 project, Judge Samuel P. King 
noted that “The court should not be used as a quasi-legislative or quasi-executive forum 
by those who are dissatisfied with policy decisions made by governing bodies.” and “The 
environmental laws were neither meant to be used as a crutch for chronic fault-finding, 
nor as a means of delaying the implementation of properly approved projects” (Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law Stop H-3 Association vs. United States Department of 
Transportation, 1982). Unfortunately, for a major infrastructure project, the NEPA and 
HEPA requirements as currently interpreted have opened the door for this so-called 
chronic fault-finding. 
The final significant common theme is that for all of the litigation associated with 
each of the reviewed projects none of the projects made significant changes to the project 
plan. The additional reviews, paperwork, and scientific studies, although time consuming 
and expensive, did not drive major changes to the project. What this tells us is that the 
level of analysis required to enable sound project decisions is not sufficient to meet 
NEPA and HEPA communication requirements as determined by the court. This puts the 
judges in the driver seat when it comes to determining the adequacy of decision analysis 
and to be successful, the project will need to balance analysis requirements between 
appeasing the courts and technical requirements.  
B. LESSONS LEARNED 
1. Contract Award 
After contract award, it becomes much more expensive for a project to defend its 
adherence to NEPA and HEPA requirements than it does to bring suit against it for 
potential non-compliance. The Superferry project provides a good example of this lesson. 
Because the Superferry itself was a private venture, the project sponsors had to take out 
significant loans to contract for the ferry’s construction. Repayment of the loans required 





and NEPA violations, the Superferry project had to cease operations while it defended its 
actions, which in turn stopped the revenue stream, forcing the project into bankruptcy. 
Had the project planned to settle the suits prior to contract awards then they may have 
had sufficient planning resources to address the court finding prior to contract award. In 
the case of the outrigger project, NASA after spending over $15 million on building the 
outrigger telescopes, and roughly two million on an EIS, decided to kill the program 
entirely. Had the litigation been completed prior to building the telescopes, NASA could 
have saved the $15 million in construction costs. This delta in cost burden between the 
plaintiff and defendant is easily used to the advantage of the plaintiff. Project managers 
need to take this into account during project planning. With the complex requirements 
governing environmental impact and land use in the state of Hawaii, what makes the 
most technical cost and schedule sense when it comes to contract type and award time 
may not equate to the optimal project plan when taking into account litigation. Litigation 
needs to be taken into account at the onset of project planning. Contract award dates, 
scope of the initial contract award, and cancelation clauses all need to be evaluated when 
determining cost and schedule risk associated with environmental litigation. Getting 
litigation out of the way before contract award is the lowest cost risk option but carries 
significant schedule risk, awarding a full contract prior to settling suits carries the lowest 
schedule risk, but highest cost risk. A balanced approach would involve an initial contract 
award to start construction, which keeps schedule risk low, flushes out the majority of 
environmental concerns, while not committing to the full construction contract, thus 
reducing cost risk. 
2. Early Communication 
The NEPA, HEPA, and the regulations that implement the acts all call for the 
early development of the EIS. “The [EIS] shall be prepared early enough so that it can 
serve practically as an important contribution to the decision making process and will not be 
used to rationalize or justify decisions already made” (Council on Environmental Quality, 





drafted in conjunction with the AoA, and for the DoD Systems Engineering Process this 
means that the EIS is drafted prior to Milestone A. In addition, the implementing 
regulations are clear that public participation is an important element of the process, and this is 
well stated in the DON implementation procedures. “The importance of public participation 
(40 CFR 1501.4(b)) in preparing environmental assessments is clearly recognized and it is 
recommended that commands proposing an action develop a plan to ensure appropriate 
communication with affected and interested parties” (U.S. Government Printing Office, 
2013). What is not clear is when the project should initially engage with the public. Based 
upon the Federal and State Regulation, the project could complete the EA before soliciting 
comments, allow the required 45 day comment period and then publish the DEIS. The case 
analysis shows that simply meeting the requirement adds risk to the project, and to reduce risk 
the project should communicate more often, and communicate earlier. 
The NEPA and HEPA requirements were enacted to support the communication 
of environmental impacts; however with advances in communication capabilities it is 
common for special interest organizations to widely communicate their stance on the 
project well before the initial EA is published. Often these views are based upon 
preliminary data, but because they are the first on the table, a reasonable percentage of 
the public will frame their views on this preliminary data. This places the project at a 
significant disadvantage, and turns the EA and EIS from a communication mechanism to 
a defense mechanism. Based upon the three case studies, it is clear that the EA, EIS and 
NEPA and HEPA requirements are a much better offensive mechanism than a defensive 
mechanism. Without early support or understanding of the Hawaiian people, it will be 
difficult to execute an infrastructure project without interruption due to lawsuit. If the 
project upon completion is expected to reduce environmental impact, when compared to 
the current methods, then this should be advertised well before the NOI for the EA is 
published. Also, if operation is expected to bring reduced environmental impact, 
separating the environmental impact of construction and operation will make it easier to 
communicate the true impact. The project needs to be in a position where the EA and EIS 





conducted to arrive at the stated conclusions. Questions regarding the quality of the 
analysis supporting the EA or EIS arise when what is believed by public and special 
interest groups, right or wrong, is disputed. Once the environmental analysis disputes 
what is held belief, then the result is the special interest groups claiming that not all 
factors were taken into account. This is nearly impossible to dispute because there are 
essentially endless factors one would need to take into account, and the project is then 
forced to evaluate these additional factors regardless of their merit, either before or after 
the court forces the issue.  
This lesson is best depicted by the Superferry project. The primary environmental 
issues cited for the Superferry project were the potential for whale strikes, the potential 
movement of invasive species, and increased neighbor island traffic.  
Regarding whale strikes, the project had planned to modify the ferry route shown 
in yellow in Figure 12. during whale season, adding additional mileage to the regular off-
season route shown in Figure 13. This change would move the route from the highly 
populated areas shown in red in to the lowly populated areas shown in yellow in Figure 
14. , which was published by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) and depicts the density of whale sightings between 1993 and 2003. In addition, 
the project plan called for employing two whale spotters, changing course within 500 
yards of whales, and employing a water jet propulsion system vice a propeller. The draft 
EIS chapter 4.2.2.4 states that the Hawaii Superferry is not a threat to marine mammals 






Figure 12.  Superferry Route during Whale Season (From RedMaui.com) 
 






Figure 14.  Humpback Whale Surface Sightings and Estimated Surface Density, Hawaiian 
Islands (From Mobley, 2004) 
Unfortunately for the Superferry project, by the time the public became aware of 
such whale avoidance and protection measures they had already determined the project to 
be a threat due to the vessel’s relatively high-speed, and no amount of data presented in 
the EIS could change that opinion.  
With regard to the introduction of invasive species, the project called for 
inspection of vehicles, passengers, and luggage, and the prohibition of sealed containers 
that could not be inspected. The draft EIS states in chapter 4.2.2.1-3 that the Superferry is 
a small player vs. the barge and airlines and has no significant impact to the movement of 
invasive species, yet that had little impact on public sentiment, again by the time it was 
published in the EIS, the public’s mind had been made up. 
 The final major issue was the impact on neighbor island traffic which was a valid 





transport roughly 280 compact cars per trip. According to a 1994 report (MIYASAKI, 
1994), there was just over 60,000 vehicles registered on the island of Kaua’i Assuming 
that there was not a decrease in registrations between 1991 and 2009, when the 
Superferry project filed for bankruptcy, and that the ferry was fully loaded with all 
vehicles departing in Kaua’i the ferry could have accounted for between a 0.5% and 1% 
increase in vehicle traffic on the island of Kaua’i. After calculating the numbers, it is 
clear that there at most could be an insignificant increase in traffic. Unfortunately, by the 
time they set out to address the misinformation, the public was convinced of the issue of 
island traffic.  
The Superferry suffered from poor public perception; this coupled with the early 
failures to publish complete environmental documentation put the project on the 
defensive vice where it should have positioned itself, on the offensive. Outside of the 
limited environmental impact, the project should have focused on the inherent 
efficiencies associated with inter-island ferry transport when compared to the more 
common air travel, and the fact that the ferry vessels were designed with the environment 
in mind, running on low sulfur number 2 diesel instead of marine diesel, employing a 
zero wastewater discharge system, and utilizing non-toxic bottom paint. These facts, if 
published early, could have sold the concept as a way to reduce environmental impact, 
and perhaps saved the project from failure. 
3. Cumulative Impacts 
Another lesson learned is the requirement to not discount past or future harm in 
evaluation of environmental impact. The Council on Environmental Quality  defines 
“Cumulative impact” as “the impact on the environment which results from the 
incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably 
foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person 
undertakes such other actions.” The Council further states that “Cumulative impacts can 
result from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a 





 Evaluating the project’s environmental impact on the current environment will 
not meet the requirements of NEPA and HEPA if the current environment has already 
been degraded due to past projects. To satisfy the cumulative impact requirement, the 
project needs to document both the impact on the current environment and the combined 
impact of the project and all past projects executed at the site. As previously discussed, 
this was demonstrated in the Keck Outrigger project when the US District Courts stating 
that NASA’s EA "fails as a whole to recognize and consider the past actions on the 
summit of Mauna Kea." And "because there is no previous EIS or EA that encompasses 
the site of the outrigger telescopes project, NASA's obligation to consider the cumulative 
impacts of development at the Keck observatory is correspondingly greater" (Tytell, 
2003). Given the number of infrastructure projects that were executed prior to the 
enacting of NEPA and HEPA, the requirement to consider past impacts may prove costly 
as the project is essentially conducting an environmental survey for the existing projects 
and all previous projects where none exists.  
In the case of the Keck Outrigger project, it was found that the addition of the 
outrigger telescopes would produce minimal additional impact “In general, the Outrigger 
Telescopes Project would add a small incremental impact” (National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration, 2005). However, the cumulative impact was substantial. To 
address the cumulative impact, NASA planned to implement mitigation plans that not 
only mitigated impacts of the Outrigger project, but also addressed existing impacts from 
past projects. As with the majority of the lessons learned, had NASA developed and 
communicated the intent to address existing environmental degradation in conjunction 
with new construction, the public may have supported the project and NASA could have 
used the dollars spent on litigation to fund the project. 
4. Precedents 
When it comes to meeting NEPA and HEPA requirements, precedents do not 
apply. Projects should not plan to not conduct an EA or EIS because similar or identical 





to NEPA and HEPA requirements or in many cases they flew under the public’s and 
regulator’s radar. Attempting to argue against the need for an EA and EIS based upon 
precedent adds significant risk to the project and goes against the lessons learned of early 
communication. The Superferry owners and former Hawaii Governor Linda Lingle 
demonstrated this lesson by setting the Superferry project on a troubled path from 
inception when it was decided that the project did not have to produce an EIS because 
one had not been required of any inter-island vessel in the past. 
Much of the debate regarding the Superferry project centered on the state’s 40 
million dollar investment for upgrades to Maui’s Kahului Harbor and the need to conduct 
an environmental study of the harbor improvements. However, after suit was filed, it was 
found that in addition to the evaluation of the harbor improvements themselves, the State 
needed to evaluate the effects of the Superferry’s use of the harbor improvements. In the 
2007 ruling which temporarily halted service, Maui Circuit Judge Joseph Cardoza stated 
that the Hawaii DOT’s 22-year operating permit with the Superferry was invalid, being a 
new technology, the impact caused by the Superferry’s use of the state harbors would 
need to be studied before the project could resume. This ruling established that an 
environmental assessment could be required for any vessel to use state owned equipment. 
This is in accordance with the HEPA regulation if a vessel operator applied for a permit 
that was processed using state funds. Prior to this ruling, there was precedent for vessels 
to use state harbors without requiring an environmental study on the impact of those 
vessels using the harbors, but this ruling demonstrates that given the wording of the 
NEPA and HEPA regulations, what has been excluded in the past is of little relevance to 
the present. 
5. Project Interfaces 
The importance of project interfaces is a lesson that was observed through 
examination of all three cases. Project interfaces can be separated into two categories; 





Discrete project interfaces come into play when a major project is broken into 
discrete serial or parallel project phases. Often this is done to meet full funding 
requirements, conduct multi-year procurements, multi-contract awards, or to utilize proof 
of concept or spiral development approaches. The Honolulu rail project is an example of 
a project broken into discrete phases. The rail project consists of four phases based upon 
geographical location. Phase one runs East Kapolei to Pearl Highlands, Phase 2 Pearl 
Highlands to Aloha Stadium, Phase 3 Aloha Stadium to Middle Street, and Phase 4 
Middle Street to Ala Moana Center as shown in Figure 15.  
 
Figure 15.  Construction Contract Phases (From Honolulu Authority for Rapid 
Transportation, 2012) 
Opponents of the rail project believed that all environmental, cultural and historic 
analysis should be completed before construction on any portion of the rail project 
commenced. The City of Honolulu and State of Hawaii argued that it would complete the 
archaeological analysis for each phase prior to construction on the affected phase. The 
argument centered on the concept that construction on one phase had the potential to 





Hawaii found that the project plans were not in violation of HEPA requirements, but did 
find that the project was in violation of HRS chapter 6E, Hawaii’s Historic Prevention 
Statute (Paulette Kaanohiokalani Kaleikini vs. Wayne Yoshioka, 2012). Although the 
project made it through the courts without a HEPA violation, the finding against the 
defendants set precedent that analysis needs to be complete for all project phases prior to 
the start of construction. 
Interfaces between enabling projects come into play when two separate programs 
are executing development projects for which, upon completion, the two infrastructures 
will support each other. This support can clearly fall into the area of cumulative impacts 
as previously discussed regarding the Outrigger Telescope Project, or it can be loosely 
tied to cumulative impacts, as was the case of the privately funded Superferry project and 
State funded dock improvement project. 
The Superferry program and the State of Hawaii entered into an agreement where 
the Superferry would provide ferry transportation and the state would provide docking 
services. The Superferry project could have planned to utilize existing infrastructure, but 
to increase the quality of service, chose to engage with the State on dock upgrades. Once 
this linkage was officially made, what both entities would later find as a result of 
litigation, from an NEPA and HEPA standpoint, the documentation of environmental 
impacts of construction of each project and utilization of the projects in conjunction with 
each other would need to be evaluated. For major projects, this can become tricky, 
especially if there are one-to-many and many-to-one interfaces between multiple projects. 
In the case of the Superferry, it was fairly straight forward because only the Superferry 
was planned to utilize the upgraded infrastructure, however, if more than one ferry 
service had planned to use the infrastructure, then all uses would have to be examined. 
This is particularly troublesome if funding is required from multiple sponsors, and 
negative environmental impacts between one sponsor pair could lead to a lack of funding 
for an enabling infrastructure for other projects. For cooperative projects, this forces 
project managers to carry risk from their project, the cooperative project, and any other 





6. Lessons Summary 
Across the three case studies, there were a number of lessons learned that fell into 
the five categories of contract award, early communication, cumulative impacts, 
precedence, and project interfaces. Within each of these categories, there was a 
reasonable amount of overlap, with a misstep in one area exacerbating or setting the stage 
for impact in another area. Overall, for a major infrastructure project, the only way to 
truly reduce risk is to begin the environmental and land use analysis early, to not attempt 
to shortcut or bypass even the smallest requirements even if the project currently has 
legislative and public support, communicate early and often, and budget both the time 
and money for the legal defense of your analysis. 
C. APPLICABILITY TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
NEPA and most likely HEPA regulations will have a significant impact on all 
future DoD sponsored infrastructure projects on the islands of Hawaii. The cost and 
schedule impacts of meeting these requirements for a major infrastructure project can be 
assumed to at a minimum be tens of millions of dollars and numerous years. A primary 
concern is that feasible alternatives may exist, which drive the project cost and schedule 
outside of the DoD timeline to meet operational goals. Cost and schedule can be 
contained if the appropriate planning and risk mitigation strategies are employed. To 
properly execute these risk mitigation strategies, the DoD will have to invest in the initial 
stages of the project, something that could prove difficult given the manner in which 
funds are appropriated by congress. 
Looking at the DoD projects that received FY13 funding appropriations, each 
project will have common and unique environmental challenges to overcome, both in 
construction and post-construction management. Major projects, such as the Combat 
Aviation Brigade Barracks, are already part of a well-documented facility master plan 
with an associated EA that covers infrastructure development for multiple years. Other 
projects are just now starting to develop their environmental analysis or moving forward 





One project that will require special attention is construction in the Pohakuloa 
Training Area; this area is in a biological, historical, and archaeological area of 
significance and the base itself has a less than perfect public image due to past 
environmental missteps, the perception of cover-ups, and encroachment into sacred lands.  
The Pohakuloa Training Area is the largest of the DoD installations in Hawaii at over 
100,000 acres. The training area and surrounding lands are currently designated as a 
conservation district. The training area is also home to nine animals and ten plants listed 
on the endangered species list. Nine archaeological sites have also been found within the 
training area, including a recently discovered petroglyphs site that forced the Army to 
abandon a recent multipurpose range complex project. Multiple residential properties are 
adjacent to the site and there is already public distrust of the management of the site due 
to the use of Depleted Uranium munitions that were initially undisclosed and the desire to 






Figure 16.  Pohakuloa Training Area and Surrounding Lands (From United States Army 





The Army does have a 20 year natural resource management plan that identifies both 
preservation and enhancement of the natural environment within the training area (United 
States Army Garrison, Hawaii, Directorate of Public Works, Environmental Division, 
2003). Even with the management plan, because much of the infrastructure at the training 
area was established before the expansion of environmental analysis and communication 
requirements were well established in the State, continued expansion of this facility may 
cause the Army to invest resources into past impact. 
Another area that contains conservation land sections is Kaneohe Bay.   Although 
sitting mostly on land that is classified as urban, it does have two conservation land 
sections, the Ulupau Crater and the Nuupia Pond Area, which need to be managed. As 
opposed to the Pohakuloa Training Area, the Kaneohe base itself has a fairly good public 
standing when it comes to environmental management, and has received numerous 
environmental management rewards to include 1984 Secretary of Defense Environmental 
Quality Award and the 1992 Secretary of the Navy Natural Resources Conservation 
Award. 
The construction projects listed in the Appropriations Bill are all to be undertaken 
on existing military installations situated on federally owned land or land that is used via 
long term lease agreement. In many ways, this reduces the burden of the EA and EIS 
process because many of these facilities have published an EA or EIS for similar projects 
in the past. The primary issue that can arise while executing new construction of 
currently used facilities is the concern of cumulative impacts, as it did with the Outrigger 
Telescope Project. This concern can be mitigated, as demonstrated by the Combat 
Aviation Brigade Complex, by identifying both cumulative impacts and beneficial 
impacts up front (US Army Corps of Engineers , 2011). 
If the Navy decides to invest in the infrastructure required to produce and 
transport bio-fuel in Hawaii, there will be significant environmental analyses to be 
conducted to meet NEPA and HEPA regulations. To reduce the schedule and financial 





magnitude, the DoD will need to implement an environmental program that pulls from 
each of the lessons learned previously discussed and risk mitigation strategies in the next 
section. Because of the potential for economic and environmental benefit that can be 
realized through the execution of this project, if done correctly, early and lasting support 
of the public can be realized. If done incorrectly, the project could suffer setbacks similar 
to that of the Superferry which also planned to bring economic and environmental 
benefits to the islands.  
D. RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES 
The most effective and potentially least costly risk mitigation strategy is early 
communication. The NEPA and HEPA regulations were put into place to ensure that 
communication was taking place between the government and the public when it came to 
impacting the environment. We have come a long way since 1970 when it comes to 
communication and environmental awareness. Today, we can be fairly certain that for 
any major or controversial infrastructure project in the state of Hawaii, there will be a 
significant amount of public communication well before the EIS is published. For this 
reason, the EA and EIS has moved from being an initial communication mechanism to 
more of a follow-up project defense and justification mechanism. The key to making it 
through the process is to craft your communication strategy so that the public and those 
elected to serve the public are hearing the true impacts from the project personnel, and 
not from each other. If the concerned stakeholders are getting early factual information, 
there is a lower probability that the speculation will get out of control. With speculation 
in check and impact facts both good and bad being communicated prior to the release of 
draft documentation, the documentation becomes an official record of what has already 
been communicated, which in turns builds trust. The goal is to ensure that the draft 
documentation is viewed as an affirmation, not a defense mechanism. Also, when 
preparing the final documentation, it is imperative that public comment on the draft 






Another risk mitigation strategy that should be executed from project inception 
along with the communication strategy is to develop an understanding of who the 
supporters, opponents, and undecided are, and why they are opposing. Some of the 
sharpest and financially able to oppose the project are business interests that stand to be 
adversely affected by the project. These business interests have the resources to combat 
the project in the courts and can supply the catalyst to rally the environmental and anti-
development side of the argument. While one is working to plan and execute the project, 
opposing interests are working to build support for their opposition. Maintaining an 
understanding of the opposition and actively working to ensure the public has equal 
exposure to the facts regarding project impacts will reduce the size of the opposing force 
and cost and schedule risk later in the project. 
A more costly strategy is to execute a comprehensive environmental review 
program from the onset. This would involve conducting analysis in excess of what would 
be required to make effective project decisions. This is a difficult balancing act for 
project managers who have been conditioned to make project decisions with 80% of the 
data.  Analysis of these projects shows that the courts are looking for more data than the 
project managers are initially producing, and that number is inching up as time goes on. 
This case study only looked at project decisions, which according to court findings, 
should have been based upon additional analysis. This study did not evaluate the 
percentage of project alternative decisions that were not questioned by the courts, and 
therefore no conclusions can be drawn regarding the cost-benefit of increasing project-
wide alternative analysis. For each project, the project manager is going to have to weigh 
the cost benefit of additional analysis with the understanding that the risk analysis needs 
to properly identify the severity of realization in the latter project phases. Simply 
identifying the severity may sufficiently create a new balance that drives the benefit of 
the additional analysis above the cost. Regardless of the decision to execute a 
comprehensive environmental review strategy, litigations, cost, and schedule need to be 
part of the project plan. The probability of publishing a final EIS without court review is 





to the magnitude of the environmental analysis plan, with high levels of analysis leading 
to smaller litigation budgets. Regardless of the budget, the project needs to have a 
defense strategy from the onset. The defense strategy needs to focus on the quality of the 
environmental analysis and if applicable, communicating that the project went above and 
beyond what the NEPA and HEPA require. This is opposed to the “justify why the 
analysis is not required” strategy that the three case studies unsuccessfully used on 
several attempts.  
Addressing existing concerns may cultivate the public support and in turn reduce 
the risk of the project ending up in court. The requirement to evaluate cumulative impact 
can add a significant financial and schedule burden to a project; however, early planning 
and communication about these issues can work in the favor of the project. In many 
cases, due to technological advances and a greater understanding of our natural 
environment, it is not cost prohibitive to reduce or “clean-up” past harm to offset project 
impacts, and it may be feasible to walk away with a net decrease in environmental 
impact. If the project can communicate balance or a net reduction in the early project 
plans, environmental assessments opponents would be hard-pressed to package their 
opposition into a NEPA or HEPA context. 
The final risk mitigation strategy is to work with supporting project managers and 
supporting agencies to develop an all-inclusive environmental and land use analysis and 
documentation strategy. If Project A is dependent upon the success of Project B then 
Project A is also dependent on Project B’s environmental compliance strategy. Building 
this strategy from project onset will reduce project cost and schedule risk and may reduce 













VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The DoD has had a strong military presence in the state of Hawaii that dates 
before the infamous attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. This presence is surely to become 
stronger as the DoD transitions to support the U.S. strategic shift in focus to the Asia-
Pacific region. Unfortunately, despite the military’s long history and significant 
contribution to the local economy, there is continued friction between the local 
communities and the military, with locals becoming increasingly concerned about the 
negative effects of military operations on the environment. This friction, if not managed 
effectively, will also become stronger in conjunction with the military’s increased 
presence.  
To execute the infrastructure development required to support an increased 
presence in the State of Hawaii, the DoD will need to effectively execute an 
environmental analysis and communication strategy for each infrastructure project. 
Executed successfully, these strategies can reduce project cost and schedule risk, while 
easing the friction between the services and the Hawaiian people. The effective execution 
of these strategies leads us to the questions that gave rise to this study. 
1. Can the DoD reduce risk to major infrastructure development projects on 
the Hawaii Islands through a greater understanding of the EIS and EA 
development and communication process? 
2. How important is public perspective to the success of major infrastructure 
projects on the Hawaiian Islands? 
Based upon the research documented in this study, it is clear that the DoD can 
reduce risk to these major infrastructure projects by better understanding the development 
and communication process associated with the EIS and EA. One must understand that 
the development and communication of the EIS and EA needs to be used as a tool vice a 





infrastructure projects on the Hawaiian Islands is the development of the EIS and the EA, 
and that missteps in these areas have the potential to put a project on a path to failure. 
The research shows that it is not uncommon for the approval and litigation associated 
with these documents to add tens of millions of dollars and months or years of delays to 
major projects. For each case study, we found that if the money that was invested in 
addressing NEPA and HEPA litigation was invested in project planning, early analysis, 
and early communication, project schedules would have been reduced and cost savings 
would have been likely.  
The research also shows that the management of public perception is of 
paramount importance to the success of infrastructure projects on the Hawaiian Islands, 
and the only way for the DoD to ethically manage this perception is to ensure that the 
public is provided factual data in which to develop their perception. The Hawaiian people 
have a long history of opposition to industrial development, especially in the rural areas 
and on the lesser populated islands. This, coupled with the existing friction with the 
military, makes it unlikely that public opinion will be favorable upon project 
announcement. Effective communication of the environmental impact will help to 
improve that perception, and the EA and EIS are tools that can be used to enable this 
communication. NEPA and HEPA were created to inform stakeholders, to include the 
public, of the environmental impact, mitigation measures, and alternatives to the 
proposed projects. Unfortunately, in today’s society where information moves at the 
speed of light, simply meeting NEPA and HEPA requirements is insufficient to mitigate 
risk to an acceptable level. The research shows that project managers and project 
sponsors must start the communication process well before the NOI to publish an EA or 
EIS is filed. Communication needs to start before public opinion based upon beliefs and 
interpretations of vocal interest groups begins to form. Today, the EA and EIS needs to 
serve as a confirmation of the information that has been publicly shared throughout the 
analysis phase. If the EA or EIS is used to rebuff public perception, right or wrong, the 
project manager and project sponsor should have a healthy financial and schedule budget 





growing expectation for the level of detail put into environmental analysis, and that the 
required level of detail is often beyond that needed to make sound project decisions. This 
needs to be accounted for when determining the scope of the environmental analysis 
required for project decisions and meeting NEPA and HEPA requirements.  
As society becomes more aware of the delicate nature of our natural environment 
and takes steps to protect it against negative impacts, we can assume that the public’s 
distaste for environmental derogation will continue to grow. This will further increase the 
attention to infrastructure projects, requiring a broader and more comprehensive 
environmental impact communication strategy. This will prove challenging as we enter 
what appears to be a fiscally conservative time when it comes to defense spending. 
 Currently DoD focuses on compliance with regulations, not project risk 
reduction.  This is an important distinction.  Existing guidance is focused on meeting 
NEPA regulations without focus on understanding the social challenges, which can be as 
great as the technological and regulatory challenges, when it comes to environmental 
management. DoD guidance needs to extend beyond regulations to include an 
understanding of these complex social challenges and the development of an associated 
risk management strategy. To be successful, the DoD needs to have a comprehensive 
strategy to meet the increasing demand for environmental impact review, prior to the 
execution of infrastructure development projects. This plan needs to focus on developing 
a balanced risk strategy using the lessons learned and mitigations presented within this 
thesis. With a sound plan and the support of the Hawaiian people, the coming years can 
bring successful movement toward the strategic Pacific shift, economic prosperity for the 
state of Hawaii, and a renewed trust and cooperation between the military and the 
Hawaiian citizens.  
B. AREAS TO CONDUCT FUTURE RESEARCH 
From the research conducted, it is clear that additional investment in early 
environmental analysis and communication will reduce project cost and schedule risk. 





level of risk reduction. The analysis shows that the investment is primarily a function of 
the project scope, initial public opinion, resources of the opposition, and true 
environmental impact. It would be beneficial to better understand the relationship 
between these factors and develop a planning model that assists the project manager with 
scoping the environmental analysis and communication aspects of the project. This model 
could serve useful both for initial planning and re-planning as factors change during the 
project lifecycle.  
Another area of further study should be the cost benefit of meeting the HEPA and 
NEPA regulations. It would be beneficial to identify concepts that could decrease the 
resources required for litigation and litigation avoidance, and increase resources utilized 






APPENDIX: NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT  
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended (Pub. L. 91-190, 42 U.S.C. 4321-4347, January 1, 1970, as amended by Pub. L. 94-52, July 3, 1975, Pub. L. 94-83, August 9, 1975, and Pub. L. 97-258, §4(b), Sept. 13, 1982) An Act to establish a national policy for the environment, to provide for the establishment of a Council on Environmental Quality, and for other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in 
Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "National Environmental Policy Act of 1969." 
Purpose 
Sec. 2 [42 USC § 4321]. The purposes of this Act are: To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation; and to establish a Council on Environmental Quality. 
TITLE I 
CONGRESSIONAL DECLARATION OF NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 





considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may -- 1. fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations; 2. assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and aesthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings; 3. attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences; 4. preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity, and variety of individual choice; 5. achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and 6. enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources. (c) The Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a healthful environment and that each person has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the environment. 










prepares a written assessment of such impacts and views for incorporation into such detailed statement. The procedures in this subparagraph shall not relieve the Federal official of his responsibilities for the scope, objectivity, and content of the entire statement or of any other responsibility under this Act; and further, this subparagraph does not affect the legal sufficiency of statements prepared by State agencies with less than statewide jurisdiction. (E) study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources; (F) recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environmental problems and, where consistent with the foreign policy of the United States, lend appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to maximize international cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality of mankind's world environment; (G) make available to States, counties, municipalities, institutions, and individuals, advice and information useful in restoring, maintaining, and enhancing the quality of the environment; (H) initiate and utilize ecological information in the planning and development of resource-oriented projects; and (I) assist the Council on Environmental Quality established by title II of this Act. 
Sec. 103 [42 USC § 4333]. All agencies of the Federal Government shall review their present statutory authority, administrative regulations, and current policies and procedures for the purpose of determining whether there are any deficiencies or inconsistencies therein which prohibit full compliance with the purposes and provisions of this Act and shall propose to the President not later than July 1, 1971, such measures as may be necessary to bring their authority and policies into conformity with the intent, purposes, and procedures set forth in this Act. 





agency, or (3) to act, or refrain from acting contingent upon the recommendations or certification of any other Federal or State agency. 
Sec. 105 [42 USC § 4335]. The policies and goals set forth in this Act are supplementary to those set forth in existing authorizations of Federal agencies. 
TITLE II 
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 
Sec. 201 [42 USC § 4341]. The President shall transmit to the Congress annually beginning July 1, 1970, an Environmental Quality Report (hereinafter referred to as the "report") which shall set forth (1) the status and condition of the major natural, manmade, or altered environmental classes of the Nation, including, but not limited to, the air, the aquatic, including marine, estuarine, and fresh water, and the terrestrial environment, including, but not limited to, the forest, dryland, wetland, range, urban, suburban an rural environment; (2) current and foreseeable trends in the quality, management and utilization of such environments and the effects of those trends on the social, economic, and other requirements of the Nation; (3) the adequacy of available natural resources for fulfilling human and economic requirements of the Nation in the light of expected population pressures; (4) a review of the programs and activities (including regulatory activities) of the Federal Government, the State and local governments, and nongovernmental entities or individuals with particular reference to their effect on the environment and on the conservation, development and utilization of natural resources; and (5) a program for remedying the deficiencies of existing programs and activities, together with recommendations for legislation. 





Sec. 203 [42 USC § 4343]. (a) The Council may employ such officers and employees as may be necessary to carry out its functions under this Act. In addition, the Council may employ and fix the compensation of such experts and consultants as may be necessary for the carrying out of its functions under this Act, in accordance with section 3109 of title 5, United States Code (but without regard to the last sentence thereof). (b) Notwithstanding section 1342 of Title 31, the Council may accept and employ voluntary and uncompensated services in furtherance of the purposes of the Council. 





to make and furnish such studies, reports thereon, and recommendations with respect to matters of policy and legislation as the President may request. 
Sec. 205 [42 USC § 4345]. n exercising its powers, functions, and duties under this Act, the Council shall -- consult with the Citizens' Advisory Committee on Environmental Quality established by Executive Order No. 11472, dated May 29, 1969, and with such representatives of science, industry, agriculture, labor, conservation organizations, State and local governments and other groups, as it deems advisable; and utilize, to the fullest extent possible, the services, facilities and information (including statistical information) of public and private agencies and organizations, and individuals, in order that duplication of effort and expense may be avoided, thus assuring that the Council's activities will not unnecessarily overlap or conflict with similar activities authorized by law and performed by established agencies. 
Sec. 206 [42 USC § 4346]. Members of the Council shall serve full time and the Chairman of the Council shall be compensated at the rate provided for Level II of the Executive Schedule Pay Rates [5 USC § 5313]. The other members of the Council shall be compensated at the rate provided for Level IV of the Executive Schedule Pay Rates [5 USC§ 5315]. 
Sec. 207 [42 USC § 4346a]. The Council may accept reimbursements from any private nonprofit organization or from any department, agency, or instrumentality of the Federal Government, any State, or local government, for the reasonable travel expenses incurred by an officer or employee of the Council in connection with his attendance at any conference, seminar, or similar meeting conducted for the benefit of the Council. 
Sec. 208 [42 USC § 4346b]. The Council may make expenditures in support of its international activities, including expenditures for: (1) international travel; (2) activities in implementation of international agreements; and (3) the support of international exchange programs in the United States and in foreign countries. 





The Environmental Quality Improvement Act, as amended (Pub. L. No. 91- 224, Title II, April 3, 1970; Pub. L. No. 97-258, September 13, 1982; and Pub. L. No. 98-581, October 30, 1984. 





promoting the advancement of scientific knowledge of the effects of actions and technology on the environment and encouraging the development of the means to prevent or reduce adverse effects that endanger the health and well-being of man; assisting in coordinating among the Federal departments and agencies those programs and activities which affect, protect, and improve environmental quality; assisting the Federal departments and agencies in the development and interrelationship of environmental quality criteria and standards established throughout the Federal Government; collecting, collating, analyzing, and interpreting data and information on environmental quality, ecological research, and evaluation. (e) The Director is authorized to contract with public or private agencies, institutions, and organizations and with individuals without regard to section 3324(a) and (b) of Title 31 and section 5 of Title 41 in carrying out his functions. 
42 USC § 4373. Each Environmental Quality Report required by Public Law 91-190 shall, upon transmittal to Congress, be referred to each standing committee having jurisdiction over any part of the subject matter of the Report. 
42 USC § 4374. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated for the operations of the Office of Environmental Quality and the Council on Environmental Quality not to exceed the following sums for the following fiscal years which sums are in addition to those contained in Public Law 91- 190: (a) $2,126,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1979. (b) $3,000,000 for the fiscal years ending September 30, 1980, and September 30, 1981. (c) $44,000 for the fiscal years ending September 30, 1982, 1983, and 1984. (d) $480,000 for each of the fiscal years ending September 30, 1985 and 1986. 
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